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THE SOCIEDAD POR ACCIONES SIMPLIFICADA:
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER REFORM OF MEXICO’S
FIRST UNIPERSONAL LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITY
Laura K. Daugherty†
Abstract: Mexico introduced its first unipersonal limited liability entity in 2016,
the Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada (“SAS”).1 The introduction of Mexico’s SAS is
in line with legal development in Latin America as a whole, where there has been a recent
trend towards introducing new unipersonal limited liability entities that are specially
designed to reduce barriers to entry for burgeoning business owners and ease the
requirements of owning a business entity. However, the Mexican SAS as it currently exists
is uniquely overly restrictive. To remedy this, some of the current restrictions on the entity
should be lifted to facilitate the functionality of the entity. Particularly considered for
further reform are the five-million-peso total annual income cap, bar on SAS entities
having juridical person shareholders, and bar on SAS entities having shareholders who are
controlling shareholders in another Mexican entity. The excessive restrictiveness of the
Mexican SAS entity is illustrated from three perspectives: legislative intent, rule of law,
and comparative law.
Cite as: Laura K. Daugherty, The Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada: Suggestions for
Further Reform of Mexico’s First Unipersonal Limited Liability Entity, 27 WASH. INT’L
L.J. 743 (2018).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, or General Law for
Commercial Corporations (“LGSM”),2 is the legal code that governs the types
of juridical entity structures available in Mexico. In March 2016, Mexico
reformed the LGSM to include the Soceidad por Acciones Simplificada, or
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instrumental help in beginning this project, instructing the author on how to start thinking about this issue in
the Mexican context, and showing her where to find pertinent Mexican sources. The author would also like
to thank María José Pérez, attorney at law, for her help in reviewing the statute translation and Comment
draft and for providing insight from her real-world experience practicing in the start-up context in Mexico.
Additionally, the author would like to thank Ernesto Mier, attorney at law, for his kind words in reviewing
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help in editing and publishing this piece.
1
The author notes that this Comment regularly cites directly from Spanish-language sources without
providing indication that the quotation is a translation. All translations (and errors) are by the author.
2
Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [LGSM], cap. XIV, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF],
04-08-1934, últimas reformas DOF 24-01-2018 (Mex.), formato PDF, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/
LeyesBiblio/pdf/144_240118.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
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simplified joint stock company (“SAS”).3 The SAS is a type of unipersonal4
limited liability business entity intended to allow owners and operators to
insulate themselves from personal liability from their business investment.5
Unlike other Mexican business entities, the SAS does not automatically
dissolve when owned by only one shareholder, but rather can be formed and
perpetually owned by a single individual.6
The Mexican SAS is an example of the development of unipersonal
entities in the civil law tradition, particularly the Latin American civil law
tradition. Such unipersonal limited liability entities are currently in vogue in
the region, as they have been introduced by multiple other Latin American
countries and encouraged by international organizations. The SAS is, at its
core, an entity designed for use by startups. In order to limit the SAS to this
group, the SAS is subject to many unique restrictions. In Mexico, the SAS
has proved controversial, with detractors arguing that the entity is risky and
regressive, while proponents argue that it eliminates bureaucratic hurdles to
foster entrepreneurial innovation. In all, the SAS is the latest innovation in
Latin American business entity law, and its unique position as a startup entity
can both support its existence and fuel its critics.
While the SAS represents a great step forward in the modernization of
Mexican commercial law, with further reform the SAS could do more to aid
its principle goal of stimulating the Mexican economy through buoying new
business owners. Such reform would be consistent with the design of
unipersonal entities in other Latin American countries. This Comment looks
to legislative intent, rule of law theory, and a comparative analysis with a
selection of similarly situated Latin American countries to make a
multifaceted case for such further reform. Primarily, an important goal of the
SAS is to foster economic growth in Mexico. The Mexican SAS may better
foster economic growth if some of the unique restrictions currently imposed
on the entity were loosened or eliminated. Additionally, the current law
necessitates reform because it lacks clarity and therefore may be difficult for
Translated from “sociedad por acciones simplificada.” Id. art. 1, frac. VII. For the original SAS
reform, see Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de la Ley General de
Sociedades Mercantiles, DOF 14-3-2016.
4
A “unipersonal” entity is one that a sole shareholder can own, although there may be additional
shareholders. This Comment uses “unipersonal” to refer both to entities that can be formed by a sole
shareholder and those that must be formed by multiple shareholders, but do not dissolve or lose limited
liability protection upon a reduction to one shareholder.
5
See LGSM cap. XIV.
6
Id. art. 260.
3
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some targeted business owners to follow. Finally, such reform would not be
unprecedented, as looking to other similarly situated Latin American
countries shows that the restrictions in question are in fact unique to the
Mexican SAS. Mexican SAS reform should look to the models of other Latin
American countries, as these jurisdictions may offer hints for how Mexico can
preserve a true startup entity form without hampering growth for businesses
that choose to form as an SAS. Principally, Mexico should consider removing
unique restrictions such as the income cap currently imposed on an SAS entity
and loosening restrictions on who may be an SAS shareholder.
There is limited English-language scholarship available on the
development of the SAS and related limited liability business entities in Latin
America, and even less in the Mexican context. This Comment seeks to bring
the conversation surrounding the Mexican SAS entity into English-language
scholarship. Knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of this entity type
may be useful for those who wish to do business in Mexico. Additionally,
this Comment hopes to interact with ongoing debates within Latin America
about how to structure new unipersonal entities and stimulate startups. Finally,
the themes presented here regarding thoughtful proliferation of new entity
forms and regulation of startup businesses, though analyzed in the Latin
American context, are applicable to law reform efforts worldwide.
As the first Mexican limited liability entity that can be owned by a
single shareholder, the SAS is a step in the right direction. However, Mexico
should loosen its restrictions on the entity in order to create a more
economically useful and enduring entity structure. In support of this claim,
Part II provides background on the historical development of unipersonal
limited liability entities in Latin America, explains what is unique about the
SAS, and outlines Mexican perspectives on the introduction of the SAS
entity—both in favor and against. Part III analyzes the legislative intent
behind the SAS implementation to illustrate that it would be better served by
a less restrictive structure, provides theoretical arguments against the
restrictive nature of the Mexican SAS from the perspective of rule of law
theory, and demonstrates the restrictiveness of the Mexican SAS when
compared to other similarly situated Latin American countries. Part IV
concludes by providing thoughts on how Mexico may further reform its
commercial law in this context.
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BACKGROUND

The Mexican SAS entity did not materialize from thin air. Long before
the introduction of the Mexican SAS, unipersonal limited liability entities
entered and developed in the civil law tradition. While the SAS is unique to
Mexico, it arises from this same legal school. However, despite the heritage
of unipersonal limited liability entities in the Latin American civil law
tradition, the Mexican SAS has been met with both praise and critique. This
Part grounds the SAS to Mexico by providing context surrounding: 1) the
development of unipersonal limited liability entities in the Latin American
civil law tradition; 2) what exactly is unique about the SAS in the Mexican
context; and 3) how Mexican commentators and stakeholders have reacted to
the introduction of the SAS entity.
A.

Development of Unipersonal Limited Liability Entities in the
Latin American Civil Law Tradition

The proliferation of SAS-type entities in Latin America can be seen as
the most recent event in a chain of developments originating from the civil
law tradition. Limited liability theory came to Latin America through the
Western European continental civil law tradition.7 While there were some
exceptions, 8 shareholder liability was generally unlimited in continental
Europe until the time of the French Revolution. In the 1780s, many French
companies began including limited liability clauses in their charters, and in
1807 the French Commercial Code was modified to provide limited liability
for joint stock companies. The French codification of limited liability
followed Napoleon—notably into the Spanish Civil Code of 1829 and from
Spain to Latin America.9
While limited liability entities were recognized in the civil law tradition
in the nineteenth century, unipersonal limited liability entities did not come
about until later. The first country to allow for unipersonal limited liability

7

Dante Figueroa, Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin
America, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 683, 699 (2012).
8
Notably, the French East India Company, which was founded in 1664. Id. at 699.
9
Id. at 699–700.
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entities was Liechtenstein in 1925,10 and the first country in Latin America to
do so was Costa Rica in 1961.11
Currently, Latin America is in the midst of a new wave of limited
liability law reform. The introduction of unipersonal limited liability entities
was intended to make these entities more accessible to new business owners
through reduced barriers to entry12 and simplification of corporate formalities,
among other aspects.13 These new entities have been described as a blend of
the civil law tradition that predominates in Latin America and the common
law tradition. Rather than adhering strictly to established positive standards
for corporate entities, as is the norm in Latin American civil law jurisdictions,
such entities provide flexible solutions reflecting the “economic needs of
common business people.”14 This law reform movement comes as part of a
recent trend in Latin America to simplify company legislation in pursuit of
economic prosperity. In contrast, the previous norm in the region was to have
the same types of legal structure and incorporation processes available for all
types of businesses, “regardless of the business’ size or stage of
development.” 15 In sum, while it is a departure from the historical Latin
American norm, decreasing rigidity is intended to increase the accessibility of
entity formation in order to encourage formal formation of businesses that
otherwise may not have registered or existed.
Such legal reform efforts have been encouraged by international
organizations. The Organization of American States (“OAS”) adopted a
Model Law on Simplified Corporations in June 2017, 16 and the United
Aramouni, Alberto, “Empresa Individual de Responsabilidad Limitada,” Revista de Derecho
Privado [RDP], vol. 8, 1992, p. 196, formato PDF, https://revistas-colaboracion.juridicas.unam.mx/
index.php/rev-derecho-privado/article/view/20088/18021 (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
11
See CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO [CÓD. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] tit. I, cap. VII (Costa Rica),
https://costarica.eregulations.org/media/codigo%20de%20comercio.pdf (providing amendment dates
indicating the duration of the law) [hereinafter CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica)]. Note that the ability of a Sociedad
Anónima to survive as a unipersonal entity and the Empresa Individual de Responsabilidad Limitada
unipersonal entity structure are both included in the original version of the law. Id.
12
Via features such as online registration systems and reduced minimum capital and registration costs.
See infra Table 1.
13
See Francisco Reyes, The Colombian Simplified Corporation: A Proposed Model for Developing
Jurisdictions, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 113, 114 (2016).
14
Id.
15
Rodrigo Novoa Urenda, The Latin American Contribution to a Model Law of Simplified Companies,
33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 167, 167 (2015).
16
Org. of Am. States [OAS], General Assembly Res. 2906 (XLVII-O/17), annex, Model Act on the
Simplified Stock Corporation (June 20, 2017), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/docs/Model_Law_on_the_
Simplified_Corporation.pdf; see also Francisco Reyes Villamizar, The Organization of American States’
Model Law on Simplified Corporations, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/
business-law-blog/blog/2017/09/organization-american-states-model-law-simplified-corporations (noting
10
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Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Working
Group on Micro-, Small-, and Medium-sized Enterprises is likewise
developing model laws on simplified and single-member business entities and
legislative guides on key principles of a business registry and limited liability
organizations.17
As of writing, such simplified and easily accessible entities have been
adopted in four Latin American countries18: Chile, adopting its Sociedad por
Acciones (joint stock company) (“Chilean SpA”) in 2007; 19 Colombia,
adopting its Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada (simplified joint stock
company) (“Colombian SAS”) in 2008;20 Mexico, adopting its Sociedad por
Acciones Simplificada (simplified joint stock company) in 2015; 21 and
Argentina, adopting its Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada (simplified joint
stock company) (“Argentine SAS”) in 2017.22 Brazil also has a bill that has
been pending since 2012 to create a Sociedade Anônima Simplificada, or
simplified joint stock company (“Brazilian SAS”). 23 Therefore, while the
Mexican SAS is unique in many ways, Mexico is not alone in its current law
reform efforts. In fact, it is one of many Latin American countries embracing
the idea that providing an accessible startup entity type, though a departure
from the Latin American legal tradition, may prove beneficial to economic
development.
that the OAS’s Model Law is based on the Colombian Sociedad de Acciones Simplificada, which has been
very successful); OAS, Inter-Am. Judicial Comm. Res 188 (LXXX-O/12) corr.1, Project For A Model Act
On Simplified Corporation (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/docs/CJI-doc_380-11_corr2.pdf
(approving the OAS project to develop the model law in 2012); Model Law on the Simplified Stock
Corporation, OAS DEP’T INT’L L.: NEWSLETTER (July 2017), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/newsletter_
Model_Law_Simplified_Corporation_Report_Jul-2017.html (describing the Model Law).
17
See generally Working Group I: 2014 to Present: Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, U.N.
COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L. [UNCITRAL], http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/
working_groups/1MSME.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2018) (listing all of the records of the working group).
18
Reyes Villamizar, supra note 16 (providing an overview of the legal developments in Latin America
as well as the OAS Model Law).
19
Law No. 20190, Introduce Adecuaciones Tributarias e Institucionales para el Fomento de la
Industria de Capital de Riesgo y Continua el Proceso de Modernizacion del Mercado de Capitales, Junio 5,
2007, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/N?i=261427&f=2007-06-05 [hereinafter
Law No. 20190 Chile].
20
L. 1258, diciembre 5, 2008, [No. 47.194] Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.),
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley_1258_2008.html.
21
LGSM cap. XIV.
22
Law No. 27349, Mar. 29, 2017, [33604] B.O. 1 (Arg.), http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/
infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=273567 [hereinafter Ley 27349 Argentina].
23
For a Brazilian government website showing the bill’s progress, see Projetos de Lei e Outras
Proposições: PL 4303/2012, CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/
fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=553029 (last visited Mar. 30, 2018) (“Altera a Lei no. 6.404, de 15 de
dezembro de 1976, para criar e disciplinar a sociedade anônima simplificada (SAS).”).
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An Overview: What Is the SAS?

The Mexican SAS is essentially a reworking of traditional Mexican
entity forms intended to make it easier for new business owners to form and
run a business while still fitting into the overarching Mexican commercial
legal framework. The key ways that the SAS is unique within Mexican law
are that it is the only Mexican limited liability commercial entity that can be
owned by a single shareholder;24 it can be incorporated in a single day via an
online system; 25 its formation does not require the services of a public
notary;26 and there is no requirement to set aside a legal reserve from the
annual net profits.27
The statement of legislative intent backing the new law explains that
the goal of the SAS is to facilitate the creation of new businesses in Mexico—
without sacrificing legal security—in order to foster job creation, healthy
economic growth, and market competitiveness through new and better
services and market prices, which in turn are to produce economic and societal
stability.28 The legal reform is targeted at youths and entrepreneurs who seek
to start a business but are challenged by the excessive and inhibitive legal
complexity of forming a business in Mexico.29 Likewise, the law addresses
24

LGSM art. 260.
Id. art. 262, frac. II. For the statement of intent or “Exposición de Motivos” of the SAS law, see
Iniciativa con Proyecto de Decreto por el que Se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley
General de Sociedades Mercantiles, del Código de Comercio, y del Código Fiscal de la Federación, 9 de
diciembre de 2014, in Decreto por el que Se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General
de
Sociedades
Mercantiles,
pt.
1,
p.
2,
DOF
14-03-2016,
formato
PDF,
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/biblio/prog_leg/Prog_leg_LXIII/031_DOF_14mar16.pdf (last visited
Apr. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Exposición de Motivos]; see also ¿Qué es una Sociedad por Acciones
Simplificada—SAS?, GOB.MX: TU EMPRESA BLOG, (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.gob.mx/tuempresa/
articulos/que-es-una-sas.
26
See LGSM art. 263, frac. VI; Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 2.
27
In Mexico, all business entities, except for the SAS, must annually set aside five percent of their net
profits as a legal reserve until the reserve fund is equal to twenty percent of the share capital of the
organization, after which the reserve must be maintained at twenty percent. See LGSM art. 20.
28
Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 1–2.
29
While this will be touched on throughout, such inhibitive requirements include, for example, the
necessity of using a notary public to form a company; the cost of forming a company, which may be
prohibitive to many would-be entrepreneurs in Mexico; the time required to form a company through a notary
public; strict corporate governance norms that may be difficult for small companies to comply with; and the
necessity of setting aside a “legal reserve” up to twenty percent of the share capital of the organization. See
generally LGSM (providing the regulations governing commercial entity forms available in Mexico and
throughout requiring the types of restrictions outlined here); see also Ease of Doing Business in Mexico,
DOING BUS., http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/mexico#starting-a-business#mexicocity (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (quoting an incorporation time in Mexico City for a Sociedad Anónima, a
standard Mexican entity type, at 8.5 days and noting that the costs of incorporation would be about 18.2% of
the standard income per capita).
25
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Mexico’s unregistered informal economy30—people who may be experienced
business owners, but who have not gone through formal business formation
procedures.31 The law is intended to create an alternative to traditional entity
types and formation procedures available only to entry-level businesses and
businesspeople where the costs of a public notary and the time needed for
administrative procedures are not merited.32 In this sense, the law can be seen
as a transitory entity for businesses to use only in the beginning phases of their
operation.33
As a unique entity, the SAS carries unique restrictions. Only natural
persons can be shareholders in SAS entities, 34 which means that the SAS
cannot have any corporate shareholders, let alone sell shares to a venture
capital firm for startup funding or serve as a subsidiary. Perhaps more
stringently, the natural person shareholders of a SAS cannot be controlling
shareholders of any other Mexican legal entity.35 So, an entrepreneur could
not maintain more than one SAS for different businesses. Additionally, SAS
entities are capped at a total annual income of $5 million MXN
(approximately $250,000 USD),36 after which they must either transform into
a different entity structure—all of which require more than one shareholder—
or lose their limited liability protection.37 The reference in the statute to “total
annual income” does not specify whether this refers to gross income, net
income, income before taxes, or income after taxes.38
30

Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 1.
In Mexico, there is a large sector particularly consisting of micro and small businesses that is
commonly known as the “informal economy.” This term refers to businesses that are not officially formed or
registered and that generally do not pay taxes. It is also known as the “shadow economy.” A common example
is many of Mexico’s prolific street vendors. See Sergio Peña, Informal Markets: Street Vendors in Mexico
City, 23 HABITAT INT’L 363, 365–67 (1999) (explaining generally what the informal economy is in the
context of street vendors in Mexico City); Krista Hughes, Mexico Aims to Bring Shadow Economy into the
Light, REUTERS (June 26, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-economy-informal/mexicoaims-to-bring-shadow-economy-into-the-light-idUSBRE95P09C20130626 (discussing the tax problems
associated with Mexico’s informal economy). While not discussed in depth here, the SAS entity’s efficacy
in actually registering the informal economy is an interesting question ripe for further study.
32
Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 2.
33
See Discución del Dictamen de las Comisiones Unidas de Comercio y Fomento Industrial, de
Hacienda y Crédito Público, y de Estudios Legislativos, Segunda, con Proyecto de Decreto por el que Se
Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, del Código de
Comercio, y del Código Fiscal de la Federación, 09 de diciembre de 2015, in Decreto por el que Se Reforman
y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, supra note 25, pt. 3
[hereinafter Discución del Dictamen].
34
LGSM art. 260.
35
Id.
36
To be adjusted annually by regulation. Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
31
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Despite these restrictions, the uniquely simple and flexible SAS has
been gaining traction in Mexico. The Mexican Subsecretary of Normativity
and Competitiveness of the Secretary of Economy reported that 7894 SAS
entities were formed online between October 2016 and October 2017, the first
year of SAS operation. The Subsecretary further reported that the numbers
have evened off, with about 1000 SAS entities registering every month. 39
While the SAS may be heavily restricted, its creation was certainly not a
legislative error, as it already shows promising patterns of use by Mexican
business owners.
C.

Mexican Perspectives on the SAS

The SAS is not without controversy in Mexico. While politically
popular, SAS introduction has sparked everything from accolades to warnings
of doom from commentators and stakeholders. This section presents the
legislative record of the SAS and arguments against introducing the SAS.
Arguments against the SAS mainly focus on it being too liberal (rather than
too restrictive), while arguments in favor are mainly from the entrepreneurial
perspective.
The legal reform that created the SAS was politically very popular in
Mexico. The bill passed in the Chamber of Senators with seventy-one votes
in favor, two votes against, and two abstentions. The bill likewise passed by
high margins in the Chamber of Representatives,40 with 428 votes in favor,
one against, and no abstentions. 41 However, there was still popular
controversy over the bill and arguments both for and against the bill presented
in the Mexican media. 42 The two most vocal groups for and against the
39

Ivette Saldaña, En Primer Año de Empresas Exprés, Se Crean 7 Mil 894, EL UNIVERSAL (Apr. 12,
2017),
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/cartera/economia/en-primer-ano-de-empresas-expres-se-crean-7mil-894.
40
In Mexico, both chambers of Congress—the Chamber of Senators and the Chamber of
Representatives—must agree on the text of a bill for it to become law. See National Parliaments: Mexico,
LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/national-parliaments/mexico.php (last updated Feb. 16,
2016).
41
Decreto por el que Se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General de
Sociedades Mercantiles, supra note 25, at 1.
42
See, e.g., Raúl Contreras Bustamante, Sociedades por Acciones Simplificadas, EXCELSIOR (Mar. 19,
2016), http://www.excelsior.com.mx/opinion/raul-contreras-bustamante/2016/03/19/1081829 (against the
bill); Analiza Comisión de Comercio creación de la Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada, SENADO DE LA
REPÚBLICA, (Nov. 26, 2015, 7:38 PM), http://comunicacion.senado.gob.mx/index.php/informacion/
boletines/25039-2015-11-27-01-40-47.html [hereinafter Analiza Comisión de Comercio] (for the bill);
Xanath Lastiri, La Nueva Ley para Crear Empresas Pymes Guarda Riesgos para Ciudadanos, Critican
Notarios, SIN EMBARGO (Feb. 11, 2016, 12:02 AM), http://www.sinembargo.mx/11-02-2016/1617823
(against the bill); Laura Adriana Esparza García, Comentarios Jurídicos Sobre las Sociedades por Acciones
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introduction of the SAS entity in Mexico were the Colegio Nacional del
Notariado Mexicano (National College of Mexican Notaries) (“Notaries”)
and the Associación de Emprendedores de México (Mexican Association of
Entrepreneurs) (“ASEM”).
The Notaries’ argument against the introduction of the SAS focused on
two main concepts: that the SAS was risky and that it was regressive. The
Notaries gave four reasons why the SAS was risky. First, forming an SAS
does not require any sort of identity corroboration in the moment of formation
and depends only on presentation of an electronic signature to open the
business.43 While people must go in person to the office of the Servicios de
Administración Tributaria (Tax Administration Service) to obtain an
electronic signature, once it has been obtained, it is located on a portable data
storage device, such as a flash drive. From that device, the signature could
arguably be easily misappropriated.44 One journalist noted that this was a
particular risk in Mexico, as Mexico has the third-highest rate of cybercrime
in the world in terms of number of victims, with sixty-eight percent of such
crimes being identity theft.45 The ability to use an electronic signature without
additional verification also means that SAS entities could arguably be formed
using nonexistent partners, dead partners, and partners without continuing
legal capacity to consent.46 Second, the SAS law does not include any official
mechanism for people to challenge that they gave consent to open a business
in their name.47 Hypothetically, if someone’s identity were to be stolen and
Simplificadas, BCS ABOGADOS (May 19, 2016), http://bcsabogados.com/comentarios-juridicos-sobre-lassociedades-anonimas-simplificadas/ (both for and against the bill); Laura Vela, ‘Empresas en un Día y Costo
Cero’, ¿En Verdad Beneficiaría a México?, DINERO EN IMAGEN (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://www.dineroenimagen.com/2016-01-20/67542 (both for and against the bill); Angélica Pineda, SAS
Abren Puerta a Empresas Fantasmas, Advierten Notarios, EL EMPRESARIO (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://elempresario.mx/actualidad/sas-abren-puerta-empresas-fantasmas-advierten-notarios (both for and
against the bill); Campus Mexicali, Explica Experta ‘Sociedades por Acciones Simplificada,’ VOCETYS
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.cetys.mx/noticias/explica-experta-sociedades-por-acciones-simplificada/
(against the bill); Héctor Galeano Inclán, 4 Riesgos que Entraña Crear la Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada,
FORBES (Mex.) (Feb. 2, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com.mx/4-riesgos-que-entrana-crear-lasociedad-por-acciones-simplificada/ (against the bill); Comisión Fiscal del Colegio de Contadores Públicos
Universidad de Guadalajara, A.C., “Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada,” Fiscool Informativo, abril 2016,
p. 5, formato PDF, http://www.ccpudg.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/4-FISCOOL-ABRIL-2016-Sociedadpor-Acciones-Simplidficada.pdf [hereinafter Fiscool Informativo] (for the bill).
43
El CNNM Presenta en Conferencia de Prensa su Postura ante la Creación de las Sociedades por
Acciones Simplificada, COLEGIO NACIONAL DEL NOTARIADO MEXICANO, http://notariadomexicano.org.mx/
eventos/postura_ante_sociedad_acciones_simplificada.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) [hereinafter
NOTARIADO MEXICANO].
44
Lastiri, supra note 42.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
NOTARIADO MEXICANO, supra note 43.
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used to open an SAS online, the identity theft victim would have no official
channel for recourse. Third, as an SAS can be registered online without the
traditional formalities required to open a business in Mexico, it creates a
blinder potentially utilizable by those who wish to operate illicit businesses
and commit crimes—particularly money laundering.48 Finally and similarly,
the Notaries argued that the SAS was vulnerable to being taken advantage of
by people who wished to form phantom and fraudulent businesses.49
The Notaries also provided three arguments why the SAS law was
regressive. First, they argued that SAS registration was not truly free, but
rather that the cost of registration is redistributed to all Mexican citizens
instead of only those who actually wished to open a business.50 Second, all
of the features of the SAS program were intended to help only one type of
business owner rather than provide services for all types of business entities.51
Lastly, and perhaps predictably from a notary professional organization, they
argued that not using a professional notary in the course of entity formation
increases the chances of making errors, which in turn can be costly to remedy
after the fact.52 While the Notaries couched their arguments as claiming the
SAS was regressive, in reality, many of their arguments were focused on
maintaining the status quo, and with it the indispensability of notaries in the
Mexican business-formation system.53
Journalists and other commentators also made additional arguments
against the SAS entity. For example, one journalist commented that the SAS
was not inherently Mexican, as it was from the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition
rather than the Roman-Germanic tradition of Mexico.54 The same journalist
also opined that the utilization of an SAS could lead to conflicts between
shareholders, lack of protection for entrepreneurial investment, lack of
transparency in the administration of the company, violations of freedom of

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
While some of the arguments put forward by the Notaries require inference into how exactly the
SAS would lead to these results, the Notaries did not flesh this out. In the spirit of reflecting Mexican
perspectives rather than her own ideas, the author has not attempted to explain potential inferences.
54
Contreras Bustamante, supra note 42. This argument is interesting in light of the fact that
unipersonal limited liability entities have existed in the continental tradition for almost a century; Mexico is
certainly not the first country to adopt this structure. See supra Part II.A.
49
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contract, and loss of business opportunities.55 Additionally, many journalists
argued that, in reality, the SAS entity does micro and small businesses no
favors, as the true hurdle for such businesses is not incorporation, but rather
surviving in the already highly competitive Mexican marketplace. 56
Journalists also pointed out that from its inception, the SAS lacked analysis
and specialized discussion in designing the reform; rather, it was a popular
idea passed without proof that it would function in practice. 57 From a
financial perspective, commentators also noted that because the SAS is
exempt from the Mexican accounting requirement called the legal reserve,
which requires businesses to set aside five percent of their earnings every year
until they hit a twenty percent reserve, investing in such businesses would be
risky for creditors.58 To the same sentiment, some banking industry players
advertised that they were untrusting of SAS companies, and would be
unwilling to provide them lines of credit or extend other benefits of the
financial system.59 Notably, these were not empty threats, as banking issues
have materialized for SAS owners.60 The sole common argument that the
SAS did not go far enough to improve access for startup founders was that,
even with the SAS entity, business founders are still required to go through
the preexisting channels to secure a business name.61 The existing process to
secure a business name can take from two to four days.62

55

Contreras Bustamante, supra note 42. However, the journalist did not explain the impetus behind
these concerns. Rather, they can be seen to illustrate the general fear of SAS entity introduction by some
Mexican commentators.
56
See, e.g., Galeano Inclán, supra note 42 (noting that 75% of new Mexican businesses close before
two years and 90% close before five years); Esparza García, supra note 42.
57
Contreras Bustamante, supra note 42.
58
Esparza García, supra note 42.
59
Id.
60
Access to banking has become a real problem for entrepreneurs who choose to form SAS entities.
Legal representatives of SAS entities have difficulty proving that they are in fact the legal representatives
because, unlike in traditional Mexican entities, their legal representative powers are not documented in a
public deed. In traditional Mexican entities that are constituted before a notary public, the powers of the legal
representative are granted before the notary and are therefore included in a public deed. As SAS entities are
not constituted before a notary, this is not the case. When SAS legal representatives wish to open a bank
account, the bank may not recognize their power as legal representatives of the entity, and they must then go
before a notary to have their powers as legal representatives granted. The notary service costs approximately
$8000 MXN (approx. $430 USD) and takes five days. While this Comment does not delve into this specific
problem, it is one of the major shortcomings of the Mexican SAS legal reform. E-mail from María José Pérez,
Assoc. Attorney at Law, Mier Esparza Abogados, S.C., to author (Mar. 23, 2018, 13:33 PST) (on file with
author).
61
Acosta, supra note 42.
62
Id. Despite the critique, this does not appear to be a particularly burdensome restriction. However,
this critique may be seen as indicative of the philosophy that SAS should be as minimally restrictive as
possible.
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The main proponent of the SAS bill was ASEM. ASEM argued that
the new law would help eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic processes and
high costs for entrepreneurs and that it would promote the foundation of new
businesses. 63 One figure published by ASEM touted that for every one
thousand SAS entities formed, entrepreneurs would save $15 million MXN
(approximately $800,000 USD) and fifty-five years of bureaucracy.64 Overall,
ASEM supported and publicized the legal reform as a victory for Mexican
entrepreneurs.
Other arguments in favor of the bill include: that the SAS could serve
as an incubator for new businesses, as it would be a useful tool for small and
medium businesses to incorporate quickly and begin generating money under
simpler operating conditions;65 the bill met the criteria of the United Nations
Commission for International Business Development and Organization of
American States guidelines;66 in practice many Mexican businesses already
had only one “true” shareholder, so there was no reason for the law not to
reflect this reality;67 introduction of the SAS could help Mexico rise in the
World Bank Doing Business Rankings by reducing the time to form a
business; 68 SAS formation avoids unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles; 69
forming an SAS can save founders up to $12,000 MXN (approximately $650
USD) over a traditional entity form;70 and the SAS law is a pro-competitive
and pro-economic development, among other arguments.71
Advocates of the SAS offered counterarguments for many of the points
raised by the SAS detractors. Generally, the comments of the Notaries were
shrugged off as an example of protectionist fear-mongering on the part of
notaries who wanted to preserve their profession’s integral position in
63

¡Entró en Vigor la Ley para Crear Empresas en un Día y Sin Costo!, ASOCIACIÓN DE
EMPRENDEDORES DE MÉXICO (Sept. 15, 2016), https://asem.mx/entro-en-vigor-la-ley-para-crear-empresasen-un-dia-y-sin-costo/.
64
Mexicanos ‘Darán el Grito’ con Constitución de Empresas en 24 Horas, EXPANSIÓN (Sept. 13,
2016,
7:45
PM),
https://expansion.mx/emprendedores/2016/09/13/mexicanos-daran-el-grito-conconstitucion-de-empresas-en-24-horas.
65
Analiza Comisión de Comercio, supra note 42 (noting that micro and small businesses account for
74.7% of brute production and 71% of jobs in Mexico, whereas 70% of micro and small businesses close
within two years in Mexico).
66
Fiscool Informativo, supra note 42.
67
Esparza García, supra note 42.
68
Fiscool Informativo, supra note 42.
69
Vela, supra note 42.
70
Pineda, supra note 42. Other sources put the cost differential of traditional entity formation higher
than $12,000 MXN. See, e.g., Lastiri, supra note 42 (noting that producing the corporate charter alone could
cost $10,000–20,000 MXN).
71
Esparza García, supra note 42.
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business formation.72 More particularly, in response to the argument that the
SAS could easily be used for illicit purposes, SAS proponents pointed out that
many businesses traditionally formed in front of notaries are already used for
illicit purposes. On this point, they noted that businesses are still required to
get state-level licenses and permits where they are subject to scrutiny. They
further argued that even without licenses and permits, when business owners
go to open a checking account, for example, there are already procedures in
place to prevent money laundering.73 In reality, any risk of using the entity
for illicit dealings is not fairly limited to the SAS or as unrestrained as its
detractors might illustrate.
At its core, the argument over the Mexican SAS is one between those
who wish to preserve the status quo and those who see introduction of a
simplified entity as an avenue for economic growth. The vast majority of the
arguments against the SAS state that it is too risky and extreme of a change
for Mexico. Many of these arguments center on fears that disrupting
traditional business entity formation processes could have collateral
consequences for business owners, clients, and unassociated third parties by
removing too many fail-safes from the entity formation process. On the other
hand, the arguments in favor of the SAS entity tout the convenience and
accessibility it provides to entrepreneurs as a source of economic growth in
Mexico.
In the spirit of the SAS advocates, this Comment takes the position that
further change and relaxation could lead to increased business development
in Mexico. While certainly a big step for Mexico, Mexico was not the first
Latin American country to reexamine traditional entity formation procedures
and introduce a SAS-type entity. Bringing the Mexican SAS closer to the
models of other similarly situated Latin American countries could foster
business creation and further enhance the simplicity of SAS use for the
everyday owner. This would, in turn, further the objectives touted by proSAS commentators as the goals of the entity. The remainder of this Comment
will focus on elucidating these arguments through analysis of legislative intent,
application of rule of law theory, and a comparative look at other similarly
situated Latin American countries.

72
73

Vela, supra note 42.
Analiza Comisión de Comercio, supra note 42.
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ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE MEXICAN SAS

Beyond the frame of the Mexican arguments for and against the SAS,
there is a third position calling for a further rollback of SAS regulations. The
SAS entity would benefit from a continued relaxation of restrictions because:
1) the SAS law as it stands is inconsistent with the goals emphasized in its
legislative intent; 2) as articulated under rule of law theory, the stringency of
the current restrictions undermines the clarity and ease of compliance with the
SAS law; and 3) comparative analysis with other similarly situated Latin
American jurisdictions demonstrates that the Mexican SAS is uniquely
restrictive.
A.

Legislative Intent Analysis: Reform of the Mexican SAS Could
Further Its Goals of Aiding Economic Development via New
Business in Mexico

Mexican SAS law should be revised to be less restrictive because less
restrictive norms would be conducive to the legislative intent behind the
introduction of the entity. In Mexico, the Exposición de Motivos, or
“Statement of [Legislative] Intent,” of a law is not considered a source for
legal interpretation, but it is useful for understanding the goals of the
legislature in enacting a law.74 In this sense, the Statement of Legislative
Intent for the Mexican SAS reform bill provides insight into what the law is
intended to address.
The Statement of Legislative Intent for the SAS75 makes clear that the
new law was envisioned to facilitate the creation and formalization of new
businesses, particularly for youths, entrepreneurs, and the informal
economy. 76 It does so by simplifying the incorporation process through
providing a free, electronic system that can be utilized without the assistance
of a public notary,77 as the types of basic businesses envisioned should not
See González Oropeza, Manuel, “La Interpretación Jurídica en México,” Isonomía: Revista de
Teoría y Filosofía del Derecho, núm. 5, octubre de 1996, pp. 65, 72–73.
75
The SAS law was initially envisioned as a modification to the existing variable capital Sociedad de
Responsabilidad Limitada, but it was ultimately enacted as a new entity type. See Exposición de Motivos,
supra note 25, at 2.
76
Id. at 1.
77
As of July 7, 2017, the electronic system was still in development to add services at the federal,
state, and municipal levels, and had cost $8,280,747.36 MXN (approximately $440,000 USD). Letter from
Andrés Alejandro Pérez Frías, Agogado General de la Secretaría de Economía y Titular de la Unidad de
Transparencia, to author (July 9, 2017) (on file with author) (Mexican Secretary of Economy responding to
a data transparency request by the author).
74
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require costly and time-consuming expert intervention. 78 The minutes of
legislative discussion on the introduction of the entity also illustrate that it was
intended as a transitory entity, fixed as such by the $5 million MXN income
cap. Its transitory entity status is intended to reflect that, on a global level,
four out of five start-up businesses fail.79
The resulting law does not necessarily reflect these goals. However,
making the legislative framework less restrictive could work to further these
goals. First, aiding budding microenterprises, while placing burdens on
businesses that grow, is not necessarily the best way to foster economic
growth in Mexico. Second, the current SAS law serves to delay the burden of
costly and administratively difficult traditional business entity formation that
requires the inclusion of additional shareholders. This creates a perverse
incentive not to grow a small business past the SAS income-cap limit, to lie
about SAS incomes, or, in the case of a truly solely-owned company, to find
a sham partner to go forward with entity conversion. Third, under creditormonitoring theory, as defined within, facilitating subsidiary creation and
allowing ownership of more than one SAS, which the current SAS law does
not permit, minimize creditor-monitoring costs and therefore foster economic
growth. Finally, limiting SAS shareholders to natural persons (rather than
also allowing juridical persons 80 as shareholders) may limit the economic
growth the law seeks to create because it complicates early funding for startup businesses.
1.

The Income Cap Is Arbitrary and Counterproductive to
Economic Growth

While research has shown that lowering the barriers to entry increases
business-formation rates in Mexico,81 the simple creation of additional micro
and small businesses is not necessarily the most effective way to foster
noticeable economic growth in Mexico. While the growth of such enterprises
does serve an important social-inclusion function, Álvaro Rodriguez Arregui
posits that it would require adding 273,000 new microenterprises to the
Mexican economy to achieve one percentage point growth of the gross
78

Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 2.
Discución del Dictamen, supra note 33, at 2.
80
“Juridical persons” refers to legal entities, as opposed to natural persons or individuals.
81
See Miriam Bruhn, License to Sell: The Effect of Business Registration Reform on Entrepreneurial
Activity in Mexico, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 382, 382 (2011) (using micro-level data to perform a statistical
analysis and finding that a previous reform simplifying business entity formation in Mexico increased the
number of registered businesses by 5% and increased wage employment by 2.2%).
79
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domestic product (“GDP”), while the same growth could be achieved from
growing 105 midsize companies into large companies.82 That is in no way to
say that it is not valuable to foster the growth and creation of micro and small
enterprises in Mexico; rather, it demonstrates that it is particularly valuable to
provide continued support and reduce the barriers to growth that these
businesses face as they scale up.83 Here, the income cap makes the SAS a
transitory entity not intended to grow with the new businesses. So, while the
Mexican SAS reduces barriers to entry for new businesses, it only helps these
businesses at the point where they make the smallest contribution to the
national economy, but does not aid them in stages where their growth could
have a more noticeable effect. In fact, by forcing a conversion to a traditional
entity as the business grows, the SAS burdens businesses with the same
barriers that it initially removed.
A counterargument to the point that the SAS would be more useful were
it not transitory by design is that the lower thresholds for SAS incorporation
necessarily mandate that the entity itself carry more restrictions than
traditional entities in order to prevent misuse. In this sense, allowing SAS
entities to be used by any business in any stage would ignore that the unique
features of the SAS are particularly tailored to micro, small, and start-up
businesses. Put simply, if the legislature had intended that any business of
any size and stage of development could be an SAS, it would have simply
reformed the traditional entity types to permit a sole shareholder or owner.
This counterargument is overshadowed by the apparent arbitrariness of
the $5 million MXN cap. As noted above, one argument against SAS
implementation is that SAS reform lacked analysis and specialized discussion
in designing the reform.84 This is illustrated in the case of the income cap.
The legislative history indicates that this cap was put in place due to fear of
small business failure.85 However, this result does not logically follow. If a
business has shown solid growth from a new company to one meeting the
Álvaro Rodríguez Arregui, Mexico’s Growth Will Come from Entrepreneurship and Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises, 7 INNOVATIONS 1, 4 (2012), https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/
10.1162/INOV_a_00110.
83
As noted above, one of the goals of the legislation was to increase registration of the already existent
informal economy. See supra Part II.B. However, past research on Mexico has shown that while former wage
earners are more likely to open a new business because of barrier reduction, unregistered business owners
are not more likely to register their business. See Bruhn, supra note 81, at 382. This is therefore an additional
reason why it makes more sense to focus on also helping new businesses as they grow rather than to simply
try to increase registration.
84
Contreras Bustamante, supra note 42.
85
Discusión del Dictamen, supra note 33, at 2.
82
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income cap, such a business should be less likely to fail rather than more likely.
Therefore, by the time businesses reach the income cap, following the logic
of the business failure risk, it does not seem pertinent to test their further
potential for success by forcing conversion. Rather, such a business should
be encouraged to continue growing by providing ongoing access to more
lenient structures where it can continue its successful corporate governance as
developed. The SAS would be more conducive to economic growth were it
reformed to likewise reduce barriers for businesses as they grow. This could
occur through total elimination of barriers such as the income cap or through
some other form of graduated, thoughtfully reasoned restrictions that grow
with the company.
2.

The Income Cap Incentivizes “Bad Behavior” by SAS
Owners

As the SAS delays the monetary and administrative burdens associated
with forming a traditional business entity in Mexico until the point where the
business reaches the income cap, this could potentially incentivize businesses
to limit or control growth as to reduce the need for conversion or misreport
total annual incomes to keep them below the SAS threshold—especially in
the case of a one-time windfall. It could also incentivize true sole business
owners to find sham shareholders or partners to allow for conversion. This is
because the other limited liability entity types available in Mexico, the
Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada, or Limited Liability Company
(“SdRL”), 86 Sociedad Anónima, or Corporation (“SA”), 87 and Sociedad
Cooperativa, or Cooperative Society (“SC”), 88 all require at least two
shareholders or partners.89 However, none of these laws have a minimum
capital-per-shareholder requirement.90 This means it is entirely possible, and
in fact common practice,91 to have a true owner of the business who holds the
majority of the capital, while another person, such as a family member, could
hold as little as one peso of capital. Rather than allow for sham associations
86

LGSM cap. IV.
Id. cap. V.
88
Id. art. 1, frac. IV; id. cap. VII; Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas [LGSC], DOF 03-08-1993,
últimas reformas 13-08-2009, formato PDF, http://www.siger.gob.mx/legismerc/LGSC.pdf (last visited Apr.
21, 2018).
89
LGSM art. 89, frac. I (Sociedad Anónima); id. arts. 59, 61 (Soceidad de Responsabilidad Limitada)
(referring to “partners,” plural, and capping the number of partners at fifty); LGSC art. 2 (Sociedad
Cooperativa) (referring to “persons,” plural).
90
See infra Table 1.
91
Esparza García, supra note 42.
87
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with realistically only one true owner, it would be preferable to reform the law
to reflect that there can be only one owner regardless of the business size.
Notably, this point does not necessarily require reforming the SAS
entity. Alternatively, the Mexican legislature could develop a second
unipersonal entity available to converting SAS entities, and could in other
regards regulate this entity like a traditional business entity. Nonetheless,
further reform is desirable to ensure that SAS entities and their owners have a
properly illuminated path to growth without unnecessary restriction.
3.

Allowing Juridical Shareholders and Ownership of
Multiple SAS Entities Would Support Economic
Efficiency

Lastly, allowing for both wholly owned subsidiaries 92 and for SAS
owners to own more than one entity is economically beneficial because it
reduces creditor-monitoring costs. As the SAS law currently stands, an SAS
cannot be used as a wholly owned subsidiary for any other entity type because
it cannot have juridical persons as shareholders.93 However, under creditormonitoring theory, wholly owned subsidiaries are typically seen as beneficial
to creditors rather than detrimental. Credit-monitoring theory explains that
when a company is able to form wholly owned subsidiaries to represent its
specialized business interests, a creditor can better evaluate the specific
business of the subsidiary. Creditors include not only financial institutions
such as banks, but also groups such as employees who receive a paycheck
after they have worked, customers who pay before receiving goods or services,
and suppliers who supply on credit. Creditors assess businesses to determine
the terms on which they will supply credit to a firm. That is, they assess the
probability that the business might fail and its ability to pay its creditors if it
does.94 For example, imagine that a business had only one entity, but from
that entity, ran a restaurant, a cookbook shop, and a noodle factory.
Alternatively, the business could have a holding company that holds three
wholly owned subsidiaries: one for the bookstore, one for the restaurant, and
one for the noodle factory. In the second scenario, it would be easier for

“Wholly owned subsidiary” refers to an entity that has as its sole shareholder another juridical entity.
LGSM art. 260.
94
Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of Contracts, 111
MICH. L. REV. 715, 720–21 (2013).
92
93
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creditors to assess the individual businesses because they would only be faced
with assessing the individual businesses rather than the entity as a whole.95
As the SAS currently exists, it discourages this result. An SAS could
run multiple types of businesses from the same entity. This is because SAS
ownership is limited to only those who are not the majority owner in any other
Mexican business entity96 as paired with the fact that the law does not limit
the licit business objectives an SAS can have97—meaning its objective could
be “any business purpose,” or the like. This is a more difficult structure for
creditors to assess than if the businesses were spread out through separate SAS
entities, either in the form of many separate businesses owned by one
shareholder or separate SAS entities owned by a holding company. Both
under the status quo and the imagined reform, these businesses could be
limited to start-ups, if the Mexican legislature so desires.
In the same vein, it would likewise be beneficial if other business entity
types could hold SAS entities for two reasons: first, allowing wholly owned
subsidiaries reduces creditor-monitoring costs; and second, allowing juridical
persons to own SAS shares fosters small-business funding. Alreadyestablished firms should likewise have access to SAS entity formation in order
to reduce their monitoring costs. Arguably, in the face of concern about
overly large businesses bypassing notary, registration, and reporting processes
by using an SAS,98 forming an SAS subsidiary is a happy medium. That is
because these businesses have already formed using the traditional, more
burdensome procedures, and would only be adding another entity to their
existing group. These businesses would not be avoiding the process
altogether, but rather streamlining their growth down the road.
Additionally, allowing for juridical-person shareholders of SAS entities
would help encourage economic growth because this is a common start-up
investment method. The standard way that venture capital firms and angel
investors (together, “VCs”) operate is by buying a portion of the equity of a
start-up that they assess as having potential and then later selling the shares
when the company becomes profitable or goes public.99 They do this because
start-ups are inherently risky, and there are generally restrictions on charging
95

For a similar explanation, see id. at 721.
LGSM art. 260.
97
Id. arts. 3, 264.
98
See generally Discusión del Dictamen, supra note 33 (discussing these concerns throughout the
legislative discussion).
99
See J. Paul Stouse, Venture Capital Financing, 49 LA. B. J. 308, 308–09 (2002).
96
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the kinds of interest that would be necessary to balance the cost and risk of
start-up investment through other types of lending. However, in the case of
the SAS, the entities are not allowed to have juridical-person shareholders.
Therefore, unless the VCs find a pertinent alternate financing method, they
will not want to invest in start-ups that are formed as an SAS. This means
that entrepreneurs hoping for early funding may be forced into the
burdensome company registration schemes that the SAS law was intended to
bypass. The SAS law should, therefore, be reformed to allow SAS entities to
take funding from firms like VCs. An alternative to a total reform allowing
any juridical person to hold shares in an SAS would be to allow only registered
financial firms or VCs to do so for investment purposes.
In order to better reflect its legislative intent as explained above, the
Mexican legislature should consider reforming the SAS law to remove the
income cap, allow the SAS to be used as a wholly owned subsidiary, allow
SAS controlling shareholders to own more than one entity, and allow for
juridical-person SAS shareholders. The income cap should be lifted or
otherwise reformed because it serves as a barrier to growth for companies,
only shifts the burdens of registration down the road, does not reflect the
reality of when businesses are most likely to fail, and, in some circumstances,
creates perverse incentives to find sham partners or limit or misrepresent
growth as to avoid the necessity of entity conversion. The SAS should be
usable as a wholly owned subsidiary and SAS controlling shareholders should
be able to hold more than one SAS because this allows for specialized entities
that in turn reduce creditor-monitoring costs—a more economically efficient
result. Finally, the SAS should be able to have juridical-person shareholders
because this enhances start-up ability to receive initial funding from outside
sources, which is important for business growth. The above ideas for lifting
restrictions can be seen as a jumping-off point for how the entity could be
reformed to increase economic benefit and efficiency.
B.

Rule of Law Analysis: The Mexican SAS Reform Lacks Clarity
and May Be Difficult to Comply With

There is a rule of law argument for reforming the Mexican SAS law
because the transitory nature of the entity creates the risk of unpredictability
for a standard user. In other words, as the SAS law currently exists, its
function may not meet its intention. Reform could foster simpler compliance
and therefore bolster the rule of law in this context. Two facets of rule of law
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deficit—reasonable clarity and capability of compliance—demonstrate this
point.
While the rule of law is defined often but rarely consistently, one of the
most well-respected conceptualizations is from Lon Fuller.100 Fuller defines
the rule of law as consisting of eight elements: the law must be 1) generally
applicable rather than decided on an ad hoc basis; 2) publicly available or
otherwise made available to affected parties; 3) prospective rather than
retroactive; 4) reasonably understandable and clear; 5) not internally
contradictory; 6) capable of being complied with—not requiring conduct
beyond the powers of the affected party; 7) reasonably stable so that the
subject can orient its actions in accordance with the law; and 8) possess
congruence between the rules as announced and their administration.101
Here, at first glance, it appears that the Mexican SAS law fulfills the
rule of law factors: 1) it applies equally to everyone who wishes to constitute
a Mexican SAS;102 2) its text is readily available both as part of the LGSM
online103 and on government web pages explaining the new entity type;104 3)
entity founders must explicitly choose the SAS entity and there is no
prescribed manner for it to be retroactively applied against their will;105 4) the
text of the law is not overly complicated106 and is broken down in various
government publications; 5) it appears theoretically possible to comply with
It seems telling of his influence on legal philosophy that a WestLaw search for “Lon /2 Fuller [as to
account for instances where his middle initial is included] & ‘rule of law’” returns 3016 law review and
journal article results. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 123 (2005) (citing
Fuller’s definition of the rule of law and noting its importance); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule
of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 784–85 (1989) (same); James W. Torke, What Is This Thing Called the Rule of
Law?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2001) (same).
101
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–39 (1964) (outlining these factors through his parable of
King Rex); Brauch, supra note 100, at 123 (citing FULLER, supra, at 38–91).
102
See generally LGSM cap. XIV (outlining the SAS law without providing exceptions requiring ad
hoc application).
103
See id.
104
See Tu Empresa, GOB.MX, https://www.gob.mx/tuempresa (providing information about what the
SAS entity is and how to form one); 6 Diferencias Entre la S.A.S. y la S.A., INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE
EMPRENDEDOR: BLOG DE EMPRENDEDOR (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.inadem.gob.mx/6-diferencias-entrela-s-a-s-y-la-s-a/ (explaining the differences between the SAS and a traditional Soceidad Anónima).
105
See generally LGSM. Notably, there is no provision allowing for another entity type to
automatically transform into an SAS if it drops to one shareholder and otherwise meets the requirements,
although the law does outline such a drop in the number of shareholders as a reason for automatic dissolution
of an entity. See id. art. 229, frac. IV.
106
See generally id. cap. XIV. The author, whose first language is not Spanish and who is not a lawyer
in any Spanish-speaking jurisdiction, found it easy to follow. See also Tu Empresa, supra note 104; 6
Diferencias Entre la S.A.S. y la S.A., supra note 104.
100
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all of the provisions of the law at the same time;107 6) with the exception of
unlikely events, such as possible government error in running the registration
system,108 the affected founder can control his or her own compliance with the
law; 7) although reasonably new, the law has not been amended since its
promulgation; 109 and 8) there is no reason to believe there is a lack of
congruence between the rules as announced and their administration, as the
government registration portal outlines the same applicable rules as the law.110
However, an issue arises when considering that, per its description of
legislative intent, the law is targeted at unsophisticated business founders,
such as youths, new entrepreneurs, and the informal economy.111 The text of
the law helps ensure this intent by stating that shareholders of an SAS may
not be controlling shareholders in any other Mexican business entity, 112
therefore limiting the pool of SAS shareholders to those who are unlikely to
be particularly experienced in managing a business entity. The provision of
the law that is problematic under the rule of law theory in this context is the
capping of annual total income of the SAS business at $5 million MXN
(approximately $250,000 USD). After the threshold point, the entity must
transform into another entity, which would require a second shareholder and
more difficult registration processes involving a public notary,113 or instantly
lose its limited liability protection.114 Arguably, this violates the rule of law
norms both of reasonable clarity—when taking into account who must
understand this legal provision—and of capability of being complied with—
when taking into account how transformation so as to maintain limited
liability is to occur.
As noted above, the law is targeted at unsophisticated businesspeople.
Therefore, it is not outside the realm of possibility that a sole SAS shareholder
may not understand the difference between income and profits and, as such,
be completely unaware that they have lost limited liability protection due to
high total annual income but low annual profits. As noted above, the text of
the law fails to specify whether this cap is gross income, net income, income
107

See generally LGSM cap. XIV.
See id. art. 263 (outlining the registration system, including points of government involvement).
109
See id. cap. XIV (amendments).
110
See Tu Empresa, supra note 104; cf. LGSM cap. XIV.
111
Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 1.
112
LGSM art. 260.
113
See, e.g., LGSM cap. V (outlining how to form a Sociedad Anónima in Mexico, which requires at
least two shareholders and the involvement of a public notary).
114
See id. art. 260 (capping SAS annual total income at $5 million MXN).
108
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before taxes, or income after taxes.115 This lack of specificity could easily
create a very confusing situation for a new business owner who does not
understand how to account for the income cap. The formation provisions for
the SAS entity make this type of error even more likely to occur. While it is
generally beneficial that the SAS can be registered online by the
shareholder(s), the lack of mandatory involvement of any sort of legal
professional 116 increases the likelihood that the shareholder(s) will be
unaware of or fail to understand the income cap risk.
Additionally, the instantaneity of losing limited liability protection if
the SAS does not transform into another entity could be considered
compliance-challenged when taking into account that registration of other
entities often takes upwards of three weeks and can cost around $30,000 MXN
(approximately $1500 USD),117 a large sum in a country where the average
monthly income is approximately $750 USD.118 The cost issue is exacerbated
when considering that the need to transform or lose liability protection is
based on income, not profits,119 so a business could technically reach the $5
million MXN limit without seeing sufficient profits to finance the
transformation. Likewise, the time it takes to constitute a different entity type
could be an issue if rapid or sudden, perhaps unforeseen, income brings the
business to the annual threshold and it does not have time to find another
shareholder and transform its entity structure.
Therefore, the provision in the law governing the Mexican SAS
providing for a $5 million MXN income cap wherein after the entity
automatically and instantly loses its limited liability protection may signal a
rule of law deficit. This is for two reasons: the type of business owners that
the law targets are particularly ill-equipped to clearly understand this rule, and
due to the instant nature of the loss of limited liability coverage, entity
conversion as a solution may not be realistically possible in all situations.

115

Id.
See id. art. 263, frac. VI (noting that the use of a public notary is optional).
117
See, e.g., 6 Diferencias Entre la S.A.S. y la S.A., supra note 104 (noting a three-week incorporation
time for Sociedades Anónimas and quoting the price at around $30,000 MXN); Ease of Doing Business in
Mexico, supra note 29 (quoting an incorporation time for a Sociedad Anónima in Mexico City of 8.5 days,
but also noting that the costs of incorporation would be about 18.2% of the standard income per capita).
118
Ease of Doing Business in Mexico, supra note 29 (noting that the gross national income per capita
is $9040 MXN, which divided by twelve produces a monthly income).
119
LGSM art. 260.
116
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Comparative Analysis: The Mexican SAS Is Uniquely Restrictive
When Compared to Similarly Situated Countries

The restrictive nature of the Mexican SAS framework is illustrated by
comparing the Mexican unipersonal limited liability entity law to those of
other similarly situated countries. When considered alongside a set of Latin
American counterparts, it is apparent that many of the restrictions critiqued
above are unique to Mexico. Appendix B provides a table comparing the
unipersonal limited liability entities of the countries discussed within on a
variety of factors.
Latin America is a region with a unique legal framework. A
fundamental uniting characteristic of the corporate legal structure norms of
most of Latin America, including Mexico, is that these norms are codebased. 120 The commercial codes of Latin America are founded on the
continental European civil law tradition, particularly the French Napoleonic
Code. 121 While the codes of different Latin American countries have
developed separately, they share the same roots. In recognition of the unique
legal heritage of Latin America, this section compares the Mexican SAS entity
to the available unipersonal limited liability entities of five other similarly
situated Latin American countries: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama,
and Uruguay.122 These countries were selected because, like Mexico, they all
have civil legal systems and they are all former Spanish colonies, thus
enhancing their shared legal heritage.123 Additionally, within the universe of
countries satisfying these general characteristics, as of the end of 2017, they
are the five largest economies based on GDP per capita, with Mexico coming
in sixth.124 These countries serve as examples of implementation (or lack of
120

Francisco Reyes Villamizar, Sociedad por Acciones Simplificadas: Una Alternativa Útil para los
Empresarios Latinoamericanos, 59 THĒMIS REVISTA DE DERECHO 73, 75–76 (2011) (Peru),
http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/themis/article/view/9096/9507.
121
Id. at 80.
122
Notably, Colombia also offers an SAS entity. However, it is not discussed in this comment as to
instead highlight the discrepancies that exist between the similarly situated Latin American countries selected,
including those that have not instituted a SAS-type entity.
123
See Courtney Jung et al., Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions, 62 AM. J. COMP.
L. 1043, 1090 tbl.A1 (2014) (listing these countries under “Pure Civil Law”); Daniel Oto-Peralías & Diego
Romero-Ávila, The Distribution of Legal Traditions Around the World: A Contribution to the Legal-Origins
Theory, 57 J.L. & ECON. 561, 573 tbl.A2 (2014) (listing these countries as former Spanish colonies).
124
See IMF DataMapper: GDP per Capita, Current Prices, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD (last visited
Apr. 21, 2018) (listing Uruguay first at $17,250 USD, Panama second at $14,410 USD, Chile third at $14,310
USD, Argentina fourth at $14,060 USD, Costa Rica fifth at $11,860 USD, and Mexico sixth at $9250 USD).
All but Mexico have a GDP per capita above the Central and South America regional averages of $5380
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implementation) of unipersonal limited liability entities in economically
successful countries with a legal heritage similar to that of Mexico.
The restrictive nature of the Mexican SAS entity is particularly
apparent when compared with its peers. The following entities will be
considered: from Argentina, the Sociedad Anónima Unipersonal, or
Unipersonal Corporation (“Argentine SAU”) and the Argentine SAS; from
Chile, the Empresa Individual de Responsabilidad Limitada, or Individual
Limited Liability Company (“Chilean EIRL”) and the Chilean SpA; from
Costa Rica, the Sociedad Anónima, or Corporation (“Costa Rican SA”) and
the Empresa Individual de Responsabilidad Limitada, or Individual Limited
Liability Company (“Costa Rican EIRL”); and, from Panama the Sociedad
Anónima, or Corporation (“Panamanian SA”). While Uruguay is included
and considered, it has no unipersonal entity. All SAS and SpA entities are
collectively referred to in this Comment as “SAS-type” entities.
Notably, the only country in this comparison that does not have a
unipersonal limited liability entity is Uruguay, 125 and the only country that
does have a unipersonal limited liability entity but does not allow for
incorporation by a single owner is Panama.126 It is therefore the norm rather
than the exception for Mexico’s Latin American peers, such as Argentina,
Chile, and Costa Rica, to allow for a unipersonal limited liability entity that
can be incorporated by the sole owner.

USD and $9300 USD, respectively. Id. As such, these countries can be considered to be relatively
economically successful in their regions.
125
See infra Table 1.
126
However, it is notable that in practice, Panamanian Sociedad Anónimas are often incorporated by
two “subscribers” who are attorneys at the firm hired by the client, and then the entity is immediately
transferred in full to the sole owner. Therefore, this two-shareholder-incorporation minimum can be seen as
more theoretical that actual. See Law No. 32, Sobre Sociedades Anónimas art. 1, Febrero 26, 1927, [5067]
GACETA OFICIAL (Panama), https://panama.eregulations.org/media/Ley%2032%20de%201927%20-%20
Sociedades.pdf [hereinafter Law No. 32 Panama], art. 1; see also Sociedades Anónimas: Preguntas
Frecuentes, DELVALLE & DELVALLE L. FIRM, https://www.delvallepanama.com/es/Sociedades-Anonimas/
preguntas-frecuentes-2.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (stating that common practice is for two lawyers
representing the client to visit the notary and serve as the two initial shareholders, and then immediately
transfer all shares to the true owner); Sociedades Anonimas en Panama, BFC LAWYERS,
http://www.offshorepanamaniancorporations.com/es/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (indicating that it is
common practice for firm lawyers to act as the initial subscribers and then, after formation and registration,
renounce their subscriber rights and transfer all shares to the client); Gilberto Boutin, Panamanian Offshore
Company Law and Conflicting Laws, 2 INT’L BUS. L.J. 171, 177 (2007) (“Truth to tell, it is inaccurate to
describe or treat simple subscribers as shareholders in the offshore company, because in most cases the
subscribers are only employees of the law firm responsible for creating the company registered.”).
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Similarly notable is the timeline for adoption of these entities in the
sample group. Costa Rica embraced single owner limited liability in 1961,127
and was followed by Panama shortly thereafter in 1966.128 However, other
countries did not follow suit for more than four decades, as Chile did not adopt
a unipersonal limited liability entity until 2003,129 and Argentina did not do
so until 2014.130 With its 2016 adoption,131 Mexico can be seen as part of this
later adoption wave of limited liability entities. This two-wave timeline also
shows a move towards easily accessible online incorporation procedures, as
all of the second wave countries have implemented some sort of online
incorporation procedure, while the countries that embraced unipersonal
limited liability in the 1960s still require some sort of in-person process.132
All the entities can be viewed as functionally similar in terms of
limiting liability, as liability is limited to either the capital of the shareholder
or promised capital of the shareholder.133 Perhaps the only exception that can
be seen as less limited is the Chilean EIRL, which only limits liability of the
owner for permissible commercial activities within the single declared
purpose of the entity.134 However, despite more severe language, functionally
this is likely fairly equivalent to the others, as it simply limits liability to
proper activities of the business. Accordingly, all the entities appear to be true
limited liability entities per the terms of their authorizing statutes.

127

See infra Table 1.
However, Panama has since retired the unipersonal limited liability entity that it enacted at that time,
the Empresa Individual de Responsabilidad Limitada (“EIRL”). See infra Table 1. Notably, Panama first
directly allowed for a unipersonal limited liability entity in 1966 with the creation of the EIRL, or Individual
Limited Liability Company. See Law No. 24, Por la Cual Se Regulan las Empresas de Responsabilidad
Limitada,
Febrero
1,
1966,
[15588]
GACETA OFICIAL,
https://docs.panama.justia.com/
federales/leyes/24-de-1966-mar-31-1966.pdf [hereinafter Law No. 24 Panama]. However, this law was
derogated in 2009, and the new law no longer recognizes the EIRL, and states that Panamanian LLCequivalents must dissolve if they have less than two shareholders for more than sixty business days. See Law
No. 4, Que Regula las Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada art. 44(8), Enero 9, 2009, [26202-A] GACETA
OFICIAL, https://docs.panama.justia.com/federales/leyes/4-de-2009-jan-15-2009.pdf.
129
See infra Table 1.
130
See infra Table 1.
131
See infra Table 1.
132
See infra Table 1. It is notable that all of the countries with online procedures advertise incorporation
times for their unipersonal limited liability entities of a day or less, and those involving some in-person aspect
likewise advertise times ranging from one to six days, while the World Bank Doing Business Data provides
times of six days (Panama) to twenty-four days (Argentina). See infra Table 1. It would be interesting to
monitor these World Bank published times and see if they decrease as online process becomes more standard
in Latin America.
133
See infra Table 1.
134
See infra Table 1.
128
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Two areas where Mexico bests many of its peers are the costs of
formation and initial capitalization. Formation of a Mexican SAS is free.135
The only other country that offers no cost to form a unipersonal limited
liability entity is Chile. 136 Costs in the other countries range from
approximately $80 USD (Argentina)137 to $990 USD (Panama).138 Likewise,
the Mexican SAS has no minimum capital requirement.139 Chile and Costa
Rica also offer no minimum capital requirements,140 but Costa Rica does not
offer free formation. 141 Therefore, the formation pricing models and
capitalization requirements used by Mexico and Costa Rica are the best in
terms of creating truly accessible entity forms by lowering the financial
barriers to entry.142
However, three areas where Mexico is comparatively, and arguably
overly, restrictive are the annual income cap of $5 million MXN, the
limitation of shareholders to natural persons only, and the limitation of
shareholders to only those who are not controlling shareholders in any other
Mexican entity. These measures are problematic either because they are not
theoretically sound, not in line with the purpose of the law, or both.143 When
viewed comparatively, it becomes apparent that these measures are also
uniquely problematic to Mexico, as none of its peers have adopted similar
provisions.144 These nonconformities are especially notable when looking to
Argentina and Chile, as their SAS-type entities are likewise targeted to startup businesses,145 but do not impose these same hurdles.

135

See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
137
See infra Table 1.
138
See infra Table 1.
139
See infra Table 1.
140
As the Panama $10,000 USD minimum capitalization requirement is an “on paper” capital
requirement and does not actually have to be paid at the time of incorporation, it could be argued that it
likewise has no minimum capital requirement for incorporation. However, given that Panama offers by far
the highest cost of incorporation, at around $990 USD, it would be hard to argue that incorporation in Panama
is without financial barriers to entry. Id.
141
See infra Table 1.
142
It is interesting that, of the countries considered, Mexico and Costa Rica have the lowest gross
domestic incomes per capita, at approximately $9040 and $10,840, respectively. See infra Table 1. This may
have influenced the importance of eliminating financial barriers to entry for start-up businesses in these
countries.
143
See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
144
See infra Table 1.
145
See Crear una Empresa, CHILE ATIENDE (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.chileatiende.gob.cl/
fichas/ver/22718 (describing the SpA as recommended for entrepreneurs seeking investors); Los
Emprendedores Argentinos Ya Pueden Crear Su Empresa en un Día en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires,
MINISTERIO DE PRODUCCIÓN (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.produccion.gob.ar/2017/09/28/los136
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Mexico is the only country imposing an income cap on any unipersonal
limited liability entity.146 Mexico’s income cap is therefore a singularly harsh
attempt to limit the use of unipersonal limited liability entities. Likewise, the
limitation to natural persons only as shareholders of its only unipersonal
limited liability entity is unique to Mexico. While Chile and Costa Rica both
limit use of their respective Chilean EIRL and Costa Rican EIRL entity forms
to natural persons only147 and place other restrictions on them, such as having
limited business objectives 148 and the inability to own other businesses, 149
each of those countries also offers a different unipersonal limited liability
entity that can have legal persons as shareholders. In addition to the EIRL
form, Chile offers the Chilean SpA, which can be incorporated by a single
shareholder who can be a legal person,150 and Costa Rica offers the Costa
Rican SA, which does require two shareholders—who can be either natural or
legal persons—to incorporate, but thereafter can reduce to one shareholder.151
This means that in both of those jurisdictions, there is an alternative available
if a company would like to form a wholly owned subsidiary. However, in
Mexico there is not.
The Argentine solution to the perceived problem of chains of
unipersonal limited liability entities is notable. In Argentina, there are two
options for unipersonal limited liability entities: 1) the Argentine SAU, which
must first be formed as an Argentine Sociedad Anónima, or Corporation
(“Argentine SA”), with a minimum of two shareholders and then later
transformed to an Argentine SAU with only one shareholder;152 and 2) the
Argentine SAS, which can be formed with only one shareholder who is a
natural or legal person.153 However, another Argentine SAS cannot own an
Argentine SAS. In this way, Argentina provides options for companies who
wish to incorporate a wholly owned subsidiary without allowing for stacking
of the less stringent SAS entities as to produce a real or perceived
overlimitation of liability through a corporate group. The Chilean, Costa
Rican, and Argentine models all provide alternatives to the currently
restrictive Mexican model.
emprendedores-argentinos-ya-pueden-crear-su-empresa-en-un-dia-en-la-ciudad-de-buenos-aires-67469
(touting the Argentine SAS as an entity for start-ups).
146
See infra Table 1.
147
See infra Table 1.
148
See infra Table 1.
149
See infra Table 1.
150
See infra Table 1.
151
See infra Table 1.
152
See infra Table 1.
153
See infra Table 1.
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Finally, the Mexican SAS is the only entity of the group that limits
shareholders to those who are not controlling shareholders in any other
Mexican entity.154 There is no analog to this in another comparable country’s
laws. In contrast, in Chile, where the Chilean EIRL is restrictive in its own
way, owners are permitted to have multiple Chilean EIRLs for different
business objectives.155 In this way, the Mexican SAS functionally limits the
amount of limited liability protection that one person can have while the
unipersonal limited liability entities of similarly situated countries limit the
liability of the business.
In summary, the timing of the Mexican SAS fits in the second wave of
unipersonal limited liability entity legislation among its Latin American peers,
and its brand of limited liability is comparable with the entities of its peers.
The areas where Mexico excels in meeting the goal of introducing an entity
structure with limited financial barriers to entry are the provision of free,
online formation procedures and the nonexistent minimum capital
requirement. However, the income cap and limitation of shareholders to only
natural persons who are not controlling shareholders in another Mexican
entity are comparatively restrictive and are ripe for reform to bring the
Mexican entity in line with its counterparts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has analyzed the Mexican SAS entity through multiple
lenses and repeatedly come to the conclusion that as it currently exists, it is
too restrictive. However, what can be done to reform this entity structure in
order to make it less restrictive?
The main drive behind the implementation of the SAS entity in Mexico
is the pursuit of economic growth through the facilitation of new business
creation. However, simply aiding new businesses to form but later throwing
them into the complicated system that the SAS entity was intended to avoid
is likely not the most effective way to meet this goal. This is both because
larger businesses can individually account for significantly more overall
economic growth and because this structure can create perverse incentives for
businesses not to grow, not to report their growth, or to find sham shareholders
for conversion. Additionally, subsidiaries, a function currently not allowed
154
155

See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
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for SAS entities, facilitate economic growth through both reducing creditormonitoring costs and allowing for venture capital investment.
Keeping these findings in mind, the SAS could be brought further in
line with its legislative intent by doing away with the earnings cap and
opening up to any type of shareholder. Eliminating the earnings cap would
be beneficial to the SAS entity because it would allow SAS entities to grow
uninhibited without fear of losing their limited liability protection, and it
would allow true single-owner entities to reflect their reality regardless of
their size. Opening SAS entities up to juridical-person shareholders would
allow the SAS to serve as a simple, easy-to-form subsidiary for companies
already in operation who have already gone through the full formation process
with a public notary and shown their legitimacy. It would also allow true
start-up SAS entities to accept venture capital funding. Venture capital
funding would be advantageous as other, more traditional methods of funding
that do not include the sale of equity may not be available at the beginning
stages of a company.
Further, the transitory nature of the Mexican SAS entity creates a risk
of unpredictability for a standard user, particularly when considering that the
law is targeted at unsophisticated users such as young people, entrepreneurs,
and the informal economy. This is because the ability to instantly lose limited
liability protection if conversion to another business entity type is not
achieved before reaching the $5 million MXN income cap may prove too
difficult or complicated in some situations. Three suggestions address this
problem. First, Mexico should consider eliminating its current restriction on
SAS shareholders that prevents those who are the controlling shareholder in
another Mexican entity from owning a SAS. This would allow the
inexperienced groups the SAS currently targets to partner with experienced
businesspeople that could guide the new business owners in following the
letter of the law. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Mexico should
consider removing the $5 million MXN income cap. It appears that the
income cap mainly serves to create an additional level of regulatory difficulty,
and without this cap, the law would be simple to follow and administer for
everyone involved. Third, if Mexico prefers to maintain the income cap, it is
important that further regulations be promulgated and accessibly published so
as to specify for a new business owner what “total annual income” means.
For example, such regulations and promulgations should directly specify
whether the cap is intended to account for gross income, net income, before
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taxes, or after taxes, and it might also include examples of financial statements
to practically demonstrate to new business owners how to locate this amount.
Finally, when compared to similarly situated Latin American countries
with a unipersonal limited liability entity, Mexico stands alone in the types of
restrictions it imposes. It is certainly true that some countries, such as Panama
and Costa Rica, have yet to introduce SAS-type entities. However, these
countries have long offered more traditional forms of unipersonal entities, and
Mexican SAS restrictions are more properly compared to other SAS-type
entities. The laws of other countries in the same vein should illustrate to
Mexico that perhaps such restrictions are unnecessary. Therefore, for Mexico
to better reflect the regional norm, it should consider eliminating the annual
$5 million MXN income cap, allowing juridical persons to be shareholders in
SAS entities, and eliminating the restriction on those who are controlling
shareholders in another Mexican entity from being shareholders in an SAS.
Comparison with other similarly situated Latin American countries also
offers reform alternatives for Mexico. For example, the Argentine SAS,
which is likewise targeted to new businesses and entrepreneurs, is not subject
to the same restrictions as the Mexican SAS. Particularly, the Argentine SAS
may have juridical shareholders. However, an SAS cannot own another SAS.
In this way, the Argentine law preserves the SAS as a start-up centric entity
rather than allowing corporate families to form consisting of SAS entities. If
Mexico wishes to reform the Mexican SAS while preserving its start-up
centric nature, it could look to the law reform efforts of similarly situated Latin
American countries, like Argentina, for alternative legal structures.
This is not to say that Mexican SAS reform going forward must be
solely for the purpose of shedding regulation. While many of the arguments
against the Mexican SAS appear to be based in notary protectionism or
general fears that are not truly unique to the SAS, there are some useful
propositions for further regulation. For example, it might be pertinent to
institute an official dispute procedure so that people who believe their
electronic signatures were used in the formation of an SAS without their
permission can dispute any attributed ownership interest. Further safeguards,
such as automatically notifying the owner of an electronic signature if said
signature is used to form an SAS or requiring SAS entities that reach a certain
income level to begin setting aside a legal reserve, may also assuage fears
about the new entity type over time.
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Despite this call for further reform, the Mexican SAS is still a great
achievement. The Mexican SAS is a huge leap towards the modernization of
Mexican company law; it is the first juridical entity in Mexico to allow for a
single shareholder, and it brought with it a sophisticated online registration
system. Additionally, in regard to accessibility, such as through the cost of
formation and any minimum capital requirements, Mexico has created a more
accessible unipersonal entity than its peers. The Mexican SAS can be seen
overall as a successful experiment: the SAS has demonstrated that Mexico is
capable of running a framework for business incorporation that can be done
quickly and online. Now that this has been tested with the small group of
business people interested in forming an SAS entity, Mexico should utilize
the springboard it has already designed and begin expanding this new
framework to a variety of entity types and other processes, such as registration
of a company name. Further reform to include a greater variety of businesses
could foster economic growth at all levels.
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Appendix A: Mexican SAS Law Reform Translation156
Monday, March 14, 2016
Reforming and Adding Various Provisions of the General Law of
Commercial Companies
Article 1.- …
I. to IV. …
V. Limited partnership with shares;
VI. Cooperative association; and
VII. Simplified joint stock company
Any of the companies referred to in parts I to V and VII of this article
can be incorporated as a variable capital company, observing then the
dispositions of Chapter VII of this law.
Article 2.- …
…
…
…
In the case of the simplified joint stock company, in order for it to be
effective before third parties, it must be registered in the aforementioned
register.
…
…
Article 5.- …
The simplified joint stock company will be formed through the process
established in Chapter XIV of this Law.
Article 20.- Except for the simplified joint stock company, every
company shall separate five percent annually, as a minimum, of the net
utilities to form the reserve fund until it is equivalent to a fifth of the share
capital.
Chapter XIV
On the simplified joint stock company
Article 260.- The simplified joint stock company is one which is
constituted by one or more individuals that are only obligated to pay their
contributions as represented in shares. In no case may individuals
simultaneously be shareholders of another type of commercial company
referred to in sections I to VII of article 1 of this Law, if their participation in
these commercial companies allows them to control the company or its
156

For the full text of the reform to the LGSM taken to include the SAS, see Decreto por el que Se
Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, DOF 14-032016
(Mex.),
formato
PDF, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/lgsm/LGSM_ref15_
14mar16.pdf.
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administration, in the terms of article 2, section III of the Securities Market
Law.
The total annual income of a simplified joint stock company may not
exceed $5 million MXN. In the event of exceeding this respective amount, the
simplified joint stock company shall be transformed into another company
regime contemplated in this Law, in the terms in which it is established in the
rules indicated in article 263 of the same. The established amount in this
paragraph shall update annually on the first of January of every year,
considering the update factor corresponding to the period from the month of
December in the penultimate year to the month of December of the year
immediately preceding for which the update is made, as will be obtained in
accordance with Article 17-A of the Fiscal Code of the Federation. The
Secretary of Economy will publish the update factor in the Official Gazette of
the Federation during the month of January of each year.
In the event that the shareholders do not carry out the transformation of
the company referred to in the previous paragraph, they will have vicarious,
joint and unlimited liability to third parties, without prejudice to any other
liability that may have been incurred.
Article 261.- The name will be formed freely, but different from that
of any other company and always followed by the words “Sociedad por
Acciones Simplificada” [Simplified Joint Stock Company] or its abbreviation
“S.A.S.”.
Article 262.- To proceed with the formation of a simplified joint stock
company, only the following will be required:
I. That there is one or more shareholders;
II. That the shareholder or shareholders externalize their consent
to form a simplified joint stock company under the bylaws
that the Secretary of Economy will make available through
the electronic formation system;
III. That any of the shareholders have authorization issued by the
Secretary of Economy for the use of the name; and
IV. That all shareholders have a current advanced electronic
signature certificate as recognized in the general rules issued
by the Secretary of Economy in accordance with the
provisions of Article 263 of this Law.
In no case shall the public deed requirement, notary public policy or
any other additional formality be required for the constitution of the simplified
joint stock company.
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Article 263.- For purposes of the provisions of article 262 of this Law,
the electronic formation system will be in the charge of the Secretary of
Economy and will be carried out by digital means through the computer
program established for that purpose, whose functioning and operation will
be governed by the general rules issued by the same Secretary.
The formation procedure will be carried out in accordance with the
following basis:
I. A folio will be opened for each formation;
II. The shareholder(s) will select bylaw clauses that the
Secretary of Economy makes available through the system;
III. The articles of organization for the simplified joint stock
company will be generated electronically signed by all the
shareholders, using the current electronic signature certificate
referred to in section IV of article 262 of this Law, which will
be delivered digitally;
IV. The Secretary of Economy will verify that the articles of
organization of the company comply with the provisions of
article 264 of this Law, and if appropriate, send them
electronically for registration in the Public Registry of
Commerce;
V. The system will digitally generate the registration slip for the
simplified joint stock company in the Public Registry of
Commerce;
VI. The use of public notaries is optional;
VII. The existence of the simplified joint stock company will be
proved by the articles of organization of the company and the
registration ticket in the Public Registry of Commerce;
VIII. The shareholders requesting the formation of a simplified
joint stock company will be responsible for the existence and
veracity of the information provided in the system.
Otherwise, they will be liable for any damages that may arise,
without prejudice to the administrative or criminal penalties
that may apply; and
IX. Other regulations as established in the rules of the electronic
formation system.
Article 264.- The bylaws referred to in the previous article should only
contain the following requirements:
I. Company name;
II. Name of the shareholders;
III. Address of the shareholders;

June 2018

The Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada

IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
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Federal Taxpayer Registry numbers of the shareholders;
E-mail address for each of the shareholders;
Domicile of the company;
Duration of the company;
The form and terms in which the shareholders are obligated
to subscribe and pay their shares;
The number, nominal value and nature of the shares in which
the capital stock in divided;
The number of votes that each of the shareholders will have
by virtue of their shares;
The purpose of the company;
The form of administration of the company.

The shareholder or shareholders will have vicarious and joint liability,
as appropriate, with the company for the commission of conduct sanctioned
as criminal.
The contracts concluded between the sole shareholder and the company
must be registered by the company in the electronic system established by the
Secretary of Economy in accordance with the provisions of article 50 Bis of
the Commercial Code.
Article 265.- All of the shares indicated in section IX of article 264
must be paid within the term of one year from the date on which the company
is registered in the Public Registry of Commerce.
When the total share capital has been subscribed and paid, the company
must publish a notice in the electronic system established by the Secretary of
Economy in terms of the provisions of article 50 Bis of the Commercial Code.
Article 266.- The Shareholders Assembly is the supreme body of the
simplified joint stock company and is made up of all the shareholders.
The resolutions of the Shareholders Assembly shall be made by
majority vote and it may be agreed that the meetings are held in person or by
electronic means if an information system is established in terms of the
provisions of article 89 of the Commercial Code. In any case, a record book
of resolutions must be kept.
When the simplified joint stock company is composed of a single
shareholder, it will be the supreme body of the company.
Article 267.- The representation of the simplified joint stock company
will be in the charge of an administrator, a function that a shareholder will
perform.
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When the simplified joint stock company is composed of a single
shareholder, it will exercise the powers of representation and will have the
position of administrator.
It is understood that the administrator, by its sole designation, may
conclude or execute all the acts and contracts included under the company
purpose or that are directly related to the existence and operation of the
company.
Article 268.- The decision-making of the Shareholders Assembly will
be governed only according to the following rules:
I. All of the shareholders will have the right to participate in the
decisions of the company;
II. The shareholders will have voice and vote, the shares will be
of equal value and confer the same rights;
III. Any shareholder may submit matters to the Assembly for
consideration, to be included in the agenda, as long as (s)he
asks the administrator in writing or by electronic means, if an
information system is agreed to in accordance with the
provisions of article 89 of the Commercial Code;
IV. The administrator will send to all shareholders the matter
subject to voting in writing or by any electronic means if an
information system is agreed to in accordance with the
provisions of article 89 of the Commercial Code, noting the
date to cast the respective vote;
V. The shareholders will cast their vote on the issues in writing
or by electronic means if an information system is agreed to
in accordance with the provisions of article 89 of the
Commercial Code, either in person or outside the meeting;
The company’s administrator will convene the Shareholders Assembly
by publication of a notice in the electronic system established by the Secretary
of Economy a minimum of five business days in advance.
The notice will include the agenda with the matters that will be
submitted to the Assembly for consideration, as well as the corresponding
documents.
If the administrator refuses to call the meeting, or does not do so within
a term of fifteen days following receipt of a shareholder request, the meeting
may be called by the judicial authority of the company’s domicile, at the
request of any shareholder.
Once the procedure established in this article has been exhausted, the
resolutions of the Shareholders Assembly are considered valid and will be
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binding on all shareholders if the vote was cast by a majority of the
shareholders, unless the right to object provided for in this Law is exercised.
Article 269.- Modifications to the bylaws will be decided by majority
vote.
At any time, shareholders may agree on forms of organization and
administration different from the one contemplated in this Chapter; provided
that the shareholders conclude the transformation of the simplified joint stock
company to any other type of commercial company before a notary public, in
accordance with the provisions of this Law.
Article 270.- Unless otherwise agreed, the alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms provided for in the Commercial Code shall be favored
to settle disputes that arise between shareholders, as well as disputes with third
parties.
Article 271.- Unless otherwise agreed, the profits will be distributed in
proportion to the shares of each shareholder.
Article 272.- The administrator will publish in the electronic system of
the Secretary of Economy the annual report on the financial situation of the
company in accordance with the rules issued by the Secretary of Economy in
accordance with the provisions of article 263 of this Law.
Failure to present the financial situation for two consecutive years will
result in the dissolution of the company, without prejudice to the liabilities
incurred by the shareholders individually. For purposes of the provisions of
this paragraph, the Secretary of Economy will issue the corresponding
declaration of non-compliance in accordance with the procedure established
in the rules mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
Article 273.- So far as they do not contradict this Chapter, the
provisions of this Law governing the corporation as well as those relating to
the merger, transformation, spin-off, dissolution and liquidation of companies
are applicable to the simplified joint stock company.
In the case of the simplified joint stock company that is composed of a
single shareholder, all of the provisions that refer to “shareholders” shall be
deemed applicable with respect to the single shareholder. Also, those
provisions that refer to “articles of organization” will be understood as
referring to the “constituent instrument.”
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Appendix B: Table 1—Comparing Available Limited Liability Unipersonal
Entities in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay
Name
of
available
unipersonal
limited
liability
entity

Mexico

Argentina

Sociedad por
Acciones
Simplificada
(SAS)157

Sociedad
Anónima
Unipersonal
(SAU)

Chile

Sociedad por
Acciones
Simplificada
(SAS)

Empresa
Individual de
Responsabilidad
Limitada
(EIRL)

Costa Rica

Panama

Uruguay
No unipersonal
limited
liability
entity
currently
available

Sociedad
Anónima
(SA)

Empresa
Individual de
Responsabilidad
Limitada
(EIRL)

Stock
Corporation

Corporation

Individual
Limited
Liability
Company

Corporation

-

Código de
Comercio, §
8163

Código de
Comercio,
Capítulo
VII164

Código de
Comercio,
Capítulo II165

Ley 32 de
1927 Sobre
Sociedades
Anónimas166

Ley
16.060 de
Sociedades
Comerciales167

Commercial
Code, § 8

Commercial
Code,
Chapter VII

Commercial
Code,
Chapter II

Law 32 of
1927 About
Corporations

Commercial
Companies Law
16.060

Sociedad por
Acciones
(SpA)

Sociedad
Anónima
(SA)

158

Translation
of name

Simplified
Stock
Corporation

Unipersonal
Corporation

Simplified
Stock
Corporation

Law
governing
entity

Ley General
de
Sociedades
Mercantiles,
Capítulo
XIV159

Ley General
de
Sociedades,
Arts. 1, 11,
94 bis., 164,
186,
187,
299160

Ley
27.349/2017
de Apoyo al
Capital
Emprendedor161

Translation
of law name

General Law
on
Mercantile
Companies,
Chapter XIV

General
Company
Law, Arts. 1,
11, 94 bis.,
164,
186,
187, 299

Law
27.349/2017
for Support
of Entrepreneurial
Capital

Year enacted
as
unipersonal
limited
liability
entity
Minimum
number of
shareholders, etc.
required at
formation
Natural vs.
legal
persons?

How
liability
limited?

is

Unclear174
2016168

One
shareholder
176

2014169

Two
shareholders

2017170

2003171

2007172

One
shareholder

One owner179

One
shareholder

178

180

177

Natural
persons
only184

Limited to
the amount
of capital per
shareholder
192

Both185

Limited to
the value of
the
shares
subscribed
per
shareholder
193

Online
registration?
Registration
time
advertised?
General time
to

Individual
Limited
Liability
Company
Ley 19.857
Autoriza el
Establecimiento
de
Empresas
Individuales
de Responsabilidad
Limitada162
Law 19.857
Authorizing
the
Establishment
of Individual
Limited
Liability
Companies

1961173

Two
shareholders

(EIRL
1966)175

One owner182

181

Both186

Natural
persons
only187

Limited to
the value of
stock
subscribed or
acquired,
including up
to the amount
of
any
promised
contributions
when dealing
with
third
parties194

Limited to the
committed
contribution
payments of
the owner for
EIRL
permissible
commercial
activities195

in

Two
shareholders

-

-

183

Natural
persons
only190

Both191

-

Limited to
amount
of
capital
(as
there is only
one
owner)198

Limited up to
the amount
the
shareholder
owes for its
shares199

-

Partial205

No206

-

Both188

Both189

Limited to
amount
of
capital per
shareholder

Limited to
amount
of
capital per
shareholder

196

197

Yes204

Yes200

No201

Yes202

Yes203

One day207

No208

Less one day
(instant)209

One day210

One to five days211

One to six
days212

-

8.5 days214

24 days215

5.5 days216

22.5 days217

6 days218

6.5 days219
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incorporate
a
business
(World Bank
Data)213

Minimum
share
capital?

$100,000
ARS
(approx.
$5,300
USD)222

No220

Cost
of
formation?

No cost

Maximum
income?

$5 million
MXN
per
year to be
adjusted
yearly
by
regulation 241
(approx.
$250,000
USD)242

Gross
Domestic
Income Per
Capita
(World Bank
Data)250

Other
notable
restrictions

231

$9,040
USD251
$753
USD/month

Shareholders
cannot
be
controlling
shareholders
in
any
other
Mexican
commercial
legal
entity257

Two times
the current
minimum
wage223
221

$1,500
232
ARS
(approx. $80
USD)233

No243

Currently
$17,720
ARS
(approx.
$950
USD)225
$4,430
ARS
(approx.
$235
USD)235

$10,000
USD
(on
paper)230

-

₡236,916.08 CRC238 (approx.
$415 USD)239

Approx.
$990 USD240

-

No247

No249

-

No226

No227

No228

No cost236

No cost237

No245

No246

No229

224

234

No244

No248

$12,140
USD255

$11,960 USD252

$13,530 USD253

$10,840 USD254

$967 USD/month

$1,128 USD/month

$903 USD/month

A SAU must
incorporate
as a Sociedad
Anónima and
may
later
transform
into a SAU258

24
hour
online
registration
is currently
only
available for
residents of
Buenos
Aires,
but
there
are
plans
to
expand the
program259

EIRL may be
used for any
civil
or
commercial
operations
“except those
reserved by
the law to
corporations,”
260
and it may
only have one
objective261

$15,230
USD256

$1,012
USD/month

$1,269
USD/
month

The
two
initial
subscribers
must
be
natural
persons264

-

EIRLs may
not
incorporate
or
acquire
other
companies262

-

-

Owners may
only
withdraw
profits from
an EIRL after
year
end
inventories
and balances
have
been
completed
and it is
shown that
the business
has realized
liquid
profits263

784

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

157

VOL. 27 NO. 3

LGSM art. 260.
See Law No. 16.060, Ley de Sociedades Comerciales art. 24, Noviembre 1, 1989, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Uru.), https://parlamento.gub.uy/documentosyleyes/leyes/ley/16060 [hereinafter LSC Uruguay] (stating that a
commercial company is considered null if it is reduced to one owner); Unidad de Apoyo al Sector Privado:
Unipersonales,
MINISTERIO
DE
ECONOMÍA
Y
FINANZAS,
https://www.mef.gub.uy/5342/8/
areas/unipersonales-Inversores,Empresas.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2018), (noting that while Uruguay recognizes
“Empresas Unipersonales,” which translates to “Individual Companies,” they are not considered to be legally separate
from their owners, and the owner is fully responsible for all obligations of the company).
159
LGSM cap. XIV.
160
Law No. 19.550, Mar. 30, 1984, [25397] B.O. 2 (Arg.), http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/
infolegInternet/anexos/25000-29999/25553/texact.htm [hereinafter LGS Argentina].
161
Ley 27349 Argentina, supra note 22.
162
Law No. 19857, Autoriza el Establecimiento de Empresas Individuales de Responsabilidad Limitada, Enero
24, 2003, D.O. (Chile), https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=207588 [hereinafter Law No. 19857 Chile].
163
Law No. 20190 Chile, supra note 19.
164
See CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica), supra note 11.
165
Id.
166
Law No. 32 Panama, supra note 126.
167
See LSC Uruguay, supra note 158.
168
Decreto por el que Se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General de Sociedades
Mercantiles, supra note 25, at 1 (legislative history record showing the timeline of the legal amendment project).
169
See LGS Argentina, supra note 160, art. 1 (by amendment).
170
See generally Ley 27349 Argentina, supra note 22.
171
Law No. 19857 Chile, supra note 162 (providing dates and amendment dates at the top of the web page).
172
See Law No. 20190 Chile, supra note 19, art. 8 (providing amendment dates in margins).
173
See CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica), supra note 11, tit. I, cap. VII (providing amendment dates). Note also that the
ability of a Sociedad Anónima to survive as a unipersonal structure and the EIRL structure are both included in the
original version of the law.
174
While the law governing formation of Panamanian corporations states that two natural-person subscribers
are required to incorporate in Panama, it is silent on whether all shares can be transferred to a single shareholder after
incorporation. This is not listed as a reason for dissolution, and total restriction on transfer of shares is prohibited. See
Law No. 32 Panama, supra note 126, arts. 1, 32; id. sec. IX. However, while Law No. 32 governing corporations was
promulgated in 1927, 1966 is considered as the year that Panama first allowed for unipersonal limited liability entities.
See Pablo Carlos Barbieri, Las Sociedades Unipersonales en el Código Civil y Comercial, SISTEMA ARGENTINO DE
INFORMACIÓN JURIDÍCA (2015), http://www.saij.gob.ar/pablo-carlos-bieri-sociedades-unipersonales-codigo-civilcomercial-dacf150286-2015-04-15/123456789-0abc-defg6820-51fcanirtcod. However, Panamanian law does allow
for anonymous holding of bearer shares after inscription, and this veil can only be lifted in cases such as money
laundering. See Boudin, supra note 126, at 181. As such, it appears that this is the most likely answer as to where
single-shareholder ownership of Panamanian SAs originated, as it does not appear to be from the text of the law
directly. Due to the lack of registration of bearer shareholders, there would be no real way to know how many
shareholders exist.
175
Notably, Panama first directly allowed for a unipersonal limited liability entity in 1966 with the creation of
the EIRL. See Law No. 24 Panama, supra note 128. However, this law was derogated in 2009. The new law no longer
recognizes the EIRL and states that Panamanian LLC-equivalents must dissolve if they have less than two shareholders
for more than sixty business days. See Law No. 4, supra note 128.
176
LGSM art. 260.
177
Brochure, Baker & McKenzie, Doing Business in Argentina 2017, at 23 (Mar. 2017),
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2017/04/bk_dbi_argentina_2017.pdf?la=
en.
178
FAQ, Ministerio de Producción, Abrí Tu Empresa SAS Más Fácil: Guía de Usuario 6,
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/sas_guia_usuario.pdf (last visited May 8, 2018).
179
Law No. 19857 Chile, supra note 162, art. 1.
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Law No. 20190 Chile, supra note 19, art. 430; see also ¿Qué es una Sociedad por Acciones (SpA)?,
MISABOGADOS.COM, (Nov. 24, 2014), https://misabogados.com/blog/es/abogado-sociedad-por-acciones.
181
See CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica), supra note 11, art. 104; see also id. art. 202 (stating that the SA is able to have
only one shareholder after incorporation, but two are required to incorporate).
182
Id. art. 9.
183
Law No. 32 Panama, supra note 126, art. 1; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
184
LGSM art. 260.
185
See LGS Argentina, supra note 160, art. 186 (describing information to be provided if a shareholder is a legal
entity).
186
FAQ, Ministerio de Producción, supra note 178, at 29. While other commercial entities may be the sole
shareholder of an SAS, a different SAS may not be the sole shareholder. Ley 27349 Argentina, supra note 22, art. 39.
Additionally, companies described in Article 299 of the Argentine General Company Law may not be the only
shareholder of a SAS, nor may they have more than 30% ownership of a SAS.) Id.
187
Law No. 19857 Chile, supra note 162, art. 1.
188
Registro de Empresas y Sociedades: Preguntas Frequentes, MINISTERIO DE ECONOMÍA FOMENTO Y TURÍSMO,
https://www.tuempresaenundia.cl/VD/PreguntasFrecuentes.aspx (last visited May 8, 2018) [hereinafter Chile
Preguntas Frequentes].
189
See CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica), supra note 11, art. 102 (referring only to “socios”—which translates to
“partners”—as those who can own the business, while the EIRL statute makes clear it can only be natural persons).
190
Id. art. 9.
191
See Sociedades Anónimas: Preguntas Frecuentes, supra note 126.
192
LGSM art. 260.
193
LGS Argentina, supra note 160, art. 164.
194
Ley 27349 Argentina, supra note 22, art. 34; Mario Eduardo Castro Sammartino, Sociedad por Acciones
Simplificada en la Argentina: Un Nuevo y Ágil Vehículo para Hacer Negocios, CASTRO SAMMARTINO & PIERINI (May
7, 2017), http://cspabogados.com.ar/sociedad-por-acciones-simplificada.
195
Law No. 19857 Chile, supra note 162, arts. 8, 12.
196
Law No. 20190 Chile, supra note 19, art. 429; ¿Qué es una Sociedad por Acciones (SpA)?, supra note 180.
197
CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica), supra note 11, art. 102; Incorporación: Diferencia Entre S.A. y S.R.L., LANG &
ASOCIADOS, https://www.langcr.com/esp/diferencias.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
198
CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica), supra note 11, art. 12.
199
Law No. 32 Panama, supra note 126, art. 39.
200
See Tu Empresa, supra note 104.
201
See Constitución de Sociedades por Acciones, ARGENTINA.GOB.AR, https://www.argentina.gob.ar/
constitucion-de-sociedades-por-acciones (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (offering instructions on how to incorporate a
Sociedad Anónima, which is the first step in creating an SAU).
202
See
Crear
una
Sociedad
por
Acciones
Simplificada
(SAS),
ARGENTINA.GOB.AR,
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/crear-una-sociedad-por-acciones-simplificada-sas (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
203
See Registro de Empresas y Sociedades, MINISTERIO DE ECONOMÍA FOMENTO Y TURÍSMO,
https://www.tuempresaenundia.cl/VD/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2018); Chile Preguntas Frequentes, supra
note 188 (listing EIRLs and SpAs among the entities that can be constituted through the government web page).
204
See Registro de Empresas y Sociedades, supra note 203; Chile Preguntas Frequentes, supra note 188.
205
See Sociedad Digital, MINISTERIO DE ECONOMÍA INDUSTRIA Y COMERCIO DE COSTA RICA,
https://costarica.eregulations.org/procedure/129/120?l=es (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (directing those who would like
to incorporate a business to first go to a notary, and then the documents can be submitted to the Costa Rican
government online). It appears to be the same website regardless of entity type.
206
Resumen de Procedimiento, MINISTERIO DE COMERCIO E INDUSTRIAS DE PANAMA,
https://panama.eregulations.org/procedure/122/12?l=es (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (detailing the steps to register a
business in Panama).
207
See ¿Qué es una Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada—SAS?, supra note 25; see also ¡Entró en Vigor la Ley
para Crear Empresas en un Día y Sin Costo!, supra note 63 (touting the one-day timeline in publication for
entrepreneurs).
208
See Constitución de Sociedades por Acciones, supra note 201; see also Ease of Doing Business in Argentina,
DOING BUS., http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/argentina#starting-a-business (last visited May 8,
2018) (while there is no official advertised time, the World Bank notes that the average time to open a business entity
with a similar procedure in Argentina is 24 days).

786

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

209

VOL. 27 NO. 3

FAQ, Ministerio de Producción, supra note 178, at 5.
See Tu Empresa en un Día, CHILE ATIENDE (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.chileatiende.gob.cl/
fichas/ver/21409. The official webpage is titled “Your Business in a Day” and appears to be available for both entity
types. Id.; see also Crear una Empresa, supra note 145.
211
Sociedad Digital, supra note 205. The same instructions appear available for both entity types. Id.
212
Resumen de Procedimiento, supra note 206.
213
Including this metric is intended to capture differences between any new laws allowing for relatively quick
entity formation and the status quo in the country.
214
See Ease of Doing Business in Mexico, supra note 29 (time to incorporate a Sociedad Anónima).
215
Ease of Doing Business in Argentina, supra note 208 (time to incorporate a Sociedad de Responsabilidad
Limitada).
216
Ease
of
Doing
Business
in
Chile,
DOING BUS.,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/
exploreeconomies/chile#starting-a-business (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (time to incorporate a Sociedad Anónima).
217
Ease of Doing Business in Costa Rica, DOING BUS., http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/
exploreeconomies/costa-rica#starting-a-business (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (time to incorporate a Sociedad Anónima).
218
Ease of Doing Business in Panama, DOING BUS., http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/
exploreeconomies/panama#starting-a-business (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (time to incorporate a Sociedad Anónima).
219
Ease of Doing Business in Uruguay, DOING BUS., http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/
exploreeconomies/uruguay#starting-a-business (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (time to incorporate a Sociedad Anónima).
220
See LGSM cap. XIV; id. art. 265 (stating that subscribed share capital must be paid up within a year of
incorporation).
221
LGS Argentina, supra note 160, arts. 11, 187 (stating that at the time of conversion into an SAU, all share
capital must be paid in).
222
XE Currency Converter: ARS to USD, XE, http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/
?Amount=100000&From=ARS&To=USD (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
223
Ley 27349 Argentina, supra note 22, art. 40.
224
FAQ, Ministerio de Producción, supra note 178, at 5.
225
XE Currency Converter: ARS to USD, supra note 222.
226
See Preguntas Frecuentes, SERVICIO DE IMPUESTOS INTERNOS, http://www.sii.cl/preguntas_
frecuentes/catastro/001_009_1955.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2018); Chile Preguntas Frequentes, supra note 188
(noting that while there is no initial minimum capital requirement, the amount should be outlined in the formation
documents).
227
See Sociedad por Acciones, INICIA TU PYME, https://iniciatupyme.cl/sociedad-por-acciones (last visited Apr.
21, 2018) (noting that the amount of share capital is fixed in the incorporation documents).
228
See FAQ, Mossack Fonseca, Costa Rica Sociedad Anonima (S.A.): Preguntas Frecuentes (Nov. 2014),
http://www.mossfon.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/CR_SA_preguntas.pdf.
229
However, at least 25% of the share capital must be paid up at the time of incorporation. CÓD. COM. (Costa
Rica), supra note 11, art. 104(b).
230
See Sociedades Anónimas: Preguntas Frecuentes, supra note 126 (noting that while the minimum share
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